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Viewpoint
Neuroprediction: New technology, old problems
Stephen J. Morsea
a  Ferdinand Wakeman Hubbell Professor of Law, Professor of Psychology & Law in Psychiatry,  
Associate Director of the Center for Neuroscience & Society, University of Pennsylvania
Neuroprediction is the use of structural or functional 
brain or nervous system variables to make any type of 
prediction, including medical prognoses and behav-
ioral forecasts, such as an indicator of future danger-
ous behavior for the purpose of involuntary civil com-
mitment. This note will focus on behavioral predictions, 
but the analysis applies to any context. The general 
 thesis is that using neurovariables for prediction is a 
new technology, but that it raises no new ethical issues, 
at least for now.
Institutions, including the legal system, routinely use 
behavioral predictions, which can have momentous 
implications for the life of the individual, for institu-
tions and for society at large. In the non-legal realm 
consider predictive tests for admission to educational 
institutions or employment opportunities. In the law, 
predictions can have particularly grave consequences, 
including the loss of liberty. For examples, the following 
all centrally involve a prediction of future dangerous 
conduct: involuntary civil commitment of the mentally 
ill, including so-called “mentally abnormal sexually vi-
olent predators”, granting bail to a criminal defendant, 
sentencing a criminal defendant, potentially even to 
death in the United States in many states, and granting 
parole. In principle, neurodata alone or in conjunction 
with other types of variables might be used for these 
and myriad other predictions.
Such serious and potentially intrusive prediction deci-
sions raise important ethical issues. Nonetheless, pri-
vate, semi-public and public institutions have all made 
the normative judgment that employing predictions is 
justifiable and, indeed, it is unlikely that any of these 
institutions could function adequately without them. 
The question is what criteria are and should be used to 
decide if a particular prediction is justifiable. I believe 
that there are two major considerations: the accuracy 
of the prediction, which is an empirical question; and 
the rate and type of inevitable prediction errors that 
are acceptable given the interests of the predictor and 
subject of the prediction, including whether other im-
portant values are potentially violated by gathering 
the basic data necessary for the prediction. We shall 
discuss these generally in order and then will turn to 
how neuroprediction bears on both.
No predictive method is error free, much like all diag-
nostic tests. All produce both false positives and false 
negatives, and low base rate behavior, such as suicide 
or homicide, is particularly prone to false positive pre-
dictions. At present, three methods are primarily used 
for behavioral prediction: clinical judgment guided by 
the clinician’s own training and experience; structured 
professional judgment in which the clinician typically 
uses a validated actuarial or semi-actuarial tool but 
then can modify the result using professional judg-
ment; and actuarial, in which the data gathered are 
largely objective and then a statistically validated algo-
rithm is applied. The comparative efficacy of these 
three methods is much-studied and the conclusion is 
inescapable that clinical judgment is the least accurate. 
There is dispute about whether actuarial is superior to 
structured professional judgment, but both are more 
accurate than clinical judgment. Even the best vali-
dated predictive methodologies still have substantial 
error rates, however, which motivates the search for 
better tools. Interestingly, the search does not require 
theoretical understanding of the causes of behavior, 
 although such understanding might well improve pre-
dictions. It is sufficient if a large data base provides 
reasonably accurate markers even if the reason that a 
variable predicts accurately is not understood.
Deciding what rate and types of error are justifiable is 
a normative issue that can be resolved only by balanc-
ing the various interests implicated by the prediction, 
including the consequences to the subject and society 
and the cost of producing the prediction. Consider the 
example of involuntary civil commitment based on a 
prediction of future dangerousness. Forced hospitaliza-
tion and mental health treatment are an enormous 
 intrusion on liberty, but avoiding harm to self or others 
is an entirely worthy goal. The more serious the harm 
predicted, the greater weight that must be given to 
harm-reduction, but how many people may appropri-
ately be hospitalized who would not cause  serious 
harm in order to prevent one person who will? Do we 
prefer to hospitalize unnecessarily to prevent a few 
harms or to hospitalize infrequently knowing that some 
preventable harms will result? These and similar ques-
tions can only be resolved morally, politically and le-
gally taking into account actual error rates and costs 
for various types of prediction, assuming that such data 
are available.
Gathering the information necessary to make a predic-
tion may involve the intrusion on other important 
 values even if the variables involved may increase the 
accuracy of a prediction. Consider the example of pri-
vacy. A subject’s genetic background, alcohol consump-
tion and sexual activity may all increase the accuracy 
of some types of prediction, but obtaining these data 
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will surely intrude on the subject’s privacy. Moreover, 
many types of data can be put to nefarious uses. These 
are familiar issues in bioethics that are often raised 
when considering health insurance and gathering pub-
lic health information generally. Whether the intrusion 
is justifiable is again a normative question that can be 
answered only by balancing the interests involved.
Now let us turn to the implications of neuroprediction 
for the above considerations. At present, there are very 
few neuropredictive tools for behavioral prediction. 
There are some “proof of concept” studies indicating 
that adding a neural variable to behavioral measures 
can increase slightly the accuracy of predictions of 
 anti-social conduct, but these techniques are simply not 
sufficiently established to be used for public policy pur-
poses. There are interesting studies suggesting that 
neural variables can help predict which mental health 
treatments will be effective with some types of patients, 
but such predictions do not raise the types of ethical 
concern that predictions of anti-social conduct or other 
types of socially consequential predictions do. In short, 
neuroprediction for public policy purposes is at present 
more of a hope than a reality, but future studies will 
certainly provide better data. Moreover, we can predict 
quite confidently, that as the neuroprediction tools be-
come more refined and produce a larger data base, we 
will be able to have a sense of how accurate they are 
alone or in tandem with other predictive methods. This 
will require expensive, methodologically difficult stud-
ies to perform, however, so I suspect that well-validated 
neuroprediction tools will not be produced in the near 
future. Note that there is nothing unique about neuro-
prediction in this respect. We can ask the question of 
comparative accuracy about any technique.
Assuming that we have a sufficient data base to know 
the error rates of various types of neuroprediction, will 
it be justified to use this methodology? We have already 
decided as a society that predictions are normatively 
justified. If neural variables increase the accuracy of 
such predictions, are not unduly costly to obtain and do 
not intrude on other values we endorse, what possible 
argument could there be for not using neural vari-
ables? How could we possibly justify engaging in a 
practice less successfully when a technique is available 
to do it better? Those who worry that neuroprediction 
may someday be “too” accurate have a substantial bur-
den to explain why too much accuracy will undermine 
the well-established normative justifiability of predic-
tive practices. Note again that the same questions can 
be raised about any technique that increases accuracy, 
whether it is genetic, neural or behavioral.
Is there something unique about neuroprediction that 
raises new ethical issues? Obtaining structural and 
functional brain scans is now quite expensive, but so 
are some behavioral measures, such as obtaining a 
psychopathy score using the Hare Psychopathy Check-
list-Revised, and the costs of scans and other neural 
measurement techniques will surely decrease over 
time. By analogy, consider how much less it costs to 
 sequence an individual’s genome than when the tech-
nique was first devised. And yet again, considering the 
cost of neuroprediction raises no new issues. Cost must 
always be balanced against the potential increase in 
accuracy for any prediction tool.
Does collecting neural data for prediction intrude more 
fundamentally on privacy and dignity than other tech-
niques? Virtually all conceivable neural measures will 
involve “brain reading”, not mind reading. Although 
there are now relatively accurate neural measures that 
can identify beyond chance whether, for example, a 
subject is adding or subtracting, or looking at a place or 
a face, these techniques do not identify the particular 
content of the cognition. They do not indicate what 
numbers are being added or subtracted or what pre-
cise face or place is being observed. They simply iden-
tify those regions of brain activity that are associated 
with the general activity in question. The same will be 
true of neuroprediction. Neural variables associated 
with the predicted behavior will not provide access to 
the content of the subject’s mental states. If neural tech-
niques could genuinely read minds, a hitherto unimag-
inable ethical challenge would be raised, but such an 
ability is science fiction at present.
There are a host of other issues neuroprediction raises 
that are thoroughly familiar to bioethicists because 
they are also raised by other techniques, such as the 
right response to incidental findings, whether the tech-
nique can be used without the subject’s cooperation, 
and whether the data collected can be put to illegiti-
mate uses. Even in the unlikely event that neuropredic-
tion were to raise such issues more acutely than other 
techniques, only the magnitude of the issue and not its 
novelty is raised. At a certain point, of course, changes 
in quantity produce changes in quality, but there is lit-
tle reason to believe that neuroprediction raises such a 
possibility.
In conclusion, neuroprediction may or may not become 
a useful tool, but if it does, we already fully possess the 
ethical theoretical resources to address any resulting 
ethical and legal challenges.
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